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    <title>ShieldedStack Blog</title>
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    <description>Supply chain security deep-dives from ShieldedStack.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 04:35:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>The Weekly Dependency Threat Report: 2026-06-20</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-weekly-dependency-threat-report-2026-06-20</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-weekly-dependency-threat-report-2026-06-20</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 04:34:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>This weekly list covers the ten most significant malicious or compromised packages recently observed in public registries.


1. @mastra/client-js (npm)

 * Package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@mastra/client-js
 * Severity: critical
 * Affected versions: 1.24.1
 * Downloads: 250837
 * First seen: 17 June 2026 at 03:32 UTC

@mastra/client-js@1.24.1 was trojanized as part of a coordinated supply chain attack on the @mastra npm organization on 2026-06-17 between 01:12-02:24 UTC. A compromised mai</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The hidden risk of license changes in open-source dependencies</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-hidden-risk-of-license-changes-in-open-source-dependencies</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-hidden-risk-of-license-changes-in-open-source-dependencies</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 08:19:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Most teams think about dependency risk in terms of CVEs, malware, and typosquatting. But there is another kind of supply-chain risk that can hit just as hard: a package you already trust can change its license in a later release, turning a routine upgrade into a legal and operational problem.

That is why license-change alerts matter. When a dependency moves from a permissive license to AGPL, a commercial license, or some other policy-breaking model, the right time to catch it is before the pack</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Weekly Dependency Threat Report: 2026-06-14</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-weekly-dependency-threat-report-2026-06-14</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/the-weekly-dependency-threat-report-2026-06-14</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 06:55:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>This weekly list covers the ten most significant malicious or compromised packages recently observed in public registries.


1. @builder.io/dev-tools (npm)

 * Package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@builder.io/dev-tools
 * Severity: critical
 * Affected versions: 1.65.0
 * Downloads: 35136
 * First seen: 11 June 2026 at 00:19 UTC

Malicious package detected. Behaviors: data exfiltration, code execution, obfuscated code.


2. events-runtime (npm)

 * Package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/events</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Top 10 malicious / compromised packages – 2026-06-07</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-06-07</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-06-07</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>This weekly list covers the ten most significant malicious or compromised packages recently observed in public registries.


1. puppeteer-core (npm)

 * Package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/puppeteer-core
 * Severity: critical
 * Affected versions: 25.1.0
 * Downloads: 18014723
 * First seen: 2 June 2026 at 13:38 UTC

Typosquatting attack. Similar to popular package: unknown. Behaviors: data exfiltration, code execution, obfuscated code.


2. @puppeteer/browsers (npm)

 * Package: https://www.</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Top 10 malicious / compromised packages – 2026-05-31</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-05-31</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-05-31</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>This weekly list covers the ten most significant malicious or compromised packages recently observed in public registries.


1. events-channel (npm)

 * Package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/events-channel
 * Severity: critical
 * Affected versions: all
 * Downloads: 39778
 * First seen: 25 May 2026 at 16:42 UTC

Sophisticated npm typosquatting supply chain attack combining fake 15-year git history forgery with cryptocurrency theft malware. Attacker created throwaway account &apos;tamekacooke21&apos; on </description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NuGet Supply Chain Security: A Practical Guide</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/nuget-supply-chain-security-a-practical-guide</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/nuget-supply-chain-security-a-practical-guide</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 08:05:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Your NuGet packages are a bigger attack surface than your code.

Think about it: when was the last time you audited a dependency before running dotnet add package? You check the download count, maybe the GitHub stars, and move on. Meanwhile, you&apos;re trusting not just that package author, but every transitive dependency, every maintainer with commit access, and every build system that touched the release.

The 2021 SolarWinds breach wasn&apos;t a sophisticated zero-day exploit. It was a compromised bui</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Top 10 malicious / compromised packages – 2026-05-25</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-05-25</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/top-10-malicious-compromised-packages-2026-05-25</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 19:52:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>This weekly list covers the ten most significant malicious or compromised packages recently observed in public registries.


1. durabletask (pypi)

 * Package: https://pypi.org/project/durabletask/
 * Severity: critical
 * Affected versions: 1.4.1-1.4.3
 * Downloads: 386297
 * First seen: 19 May 2026 at 17:58 UTC

TeamPCP compromised a legitimate PyPI contributor and published three malicious versions of durabletask (1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3) to PyPI — a Python package implementing Microsoft Azure&apos;s </description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GitHub Actions Security Checklist for the Supply Chain Attack Era</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/github-actions-security-checklist-for-the-supply-chain-attack-era</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/github-actions-security-checklist-for-the-supply-chain-attack-era</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2026 18:40:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>GitHub Actions is one of the most convenient ways to automate builds, tests, releases, and deployments. It is also one of the easiest places to accidentally hand attackers a path into your software supply chain when workflow trust boundaries are too loose.

That matters more now because recent supply chain incidents have followed the same pattern again and again: compromise the build path, steal a token, poison a release, and let downstream users do the rest.

This checklist focuses on the mista</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How ShieldedStack Uses Kiota to Keep Frontend and Backend in Sync</title>
      <link>https://shieldedstack.com/blog/how-shieldedstack-uses-kiota-to-keep-frontend-and-backend-in-sync</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://shieldedstack.com/blog/how-shieldedstack-uses-kiota-to-keep-frontend-and-backend-in-sync</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:45:52 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In ShieldedStack, the Control Plane frontend doesn’t manually define API calls. Instead, it consumes a fully generated, strongly typed TypeScript client. Built directly from the backend’s OpenAPI specification using Kiota.

This approach keeps the frontend and backend in lockstep, eliminates drift, and removes a whole class of runtime errors caused by mismatched contracts.


Build-Time: Generating the Client

The process starts in the backend project (API). During the build, the API emits an Ope</description>
      <author>noreply@shieldedstack.com (Alex Wichmann)</author>
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